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Over the past 30 years, behavioral
and experimental economists and
psychologists have made great strides in
identifying phenomena that cannot be
explained by the classical model of ratio-
nal choice—anomalies in the discounting
of future wealth, present bias, loss aver-
sion, the endowment effect, and aversion
to ambiguity, for example. In response to
these findings, there has been an enormous
amount of research by behavioral scientists
aimed at modeling and understanding the
nature of these biases 1. However, these
models, typically assuming situation-
specific psychological processes, have shed
limited light on the conditions for and
boundaries of the different biases, substan-
tially neglecting their relative importance
and joint effect. Much less attention has
been paid to the investigation of the links
between different biases. As a consequence
of this approach, it is not always clear
which model should be used to predict
behavior in a new setting, and maybe a
more general theory is needed. We believe
that the field of neuroeconomics, which
has experienced a rapid growth over the
past decade, can play an important role
in bridging these gaps, contributing to the
building of a general theoretical frame-
work for judgment and decision-making
behaviors.
APPARENTLY INCONSISTENT BIASES
One of the main insights from decision-
making studies is that people tend to
1Including the line of research that Gigerenzer and
Selten (2002) refer to as “Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU) repair program.” The main shortcomings of
this approach have been recently pointed out by Erev
and Roth (2014).
overweight small probability events in
risky one-shot decisions (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). This tendency can explain
why, for example, people buy lottery tick-
ets and insurance. However, one might
wonder, for instance, why in most Western
Countries driving insurance is compulsory
(how many drivers would spontaneously
ensure?); Why the enforcement of safety
rules at the workplace and of safe medi-
cal procedures have become social issues
of primary importance, causing massive
public and private investments (Erev et al.,
2010); or why only a small share of peo-
ple actually participate in lotto games on
a regular basis (Pérez and Humphreys,
2011). Answering such questions, recent
experimental studies have shown that
in repeated decisions with feedback,
people tend to underweight small prob-
ability events, and behave as if “it
won’t happen to me” (Barron and Erev,
2003; Hertwig and Erev, 2009)2.
We could simply conclude that peo-
ple tend to overweight rare events in
one-shot decisions from description, and
underweight rare events in experience-
based decisions. Unfortunately, this asser-
tion cannot predict behavior in a situation
in which decision makers are provided
with both the description of the incen-
tive structure and feedback about their
own choices (see Lejarraga and Gonzalez,
2011). To better illustrate this problem,
consider the situation in which people can
choose whether to insure against rare dev-
astating natural events, whose occurrence
2Underweighting of rare events can be nicely captured
by the assertion that decision makers tend to rely on
small samples of past experiences in similar situations
(Hau et al., 2008; Nevo and Erev, 2012).
rate and effect are known (see Marchiori
et al., 2015): Will people be willing to
buy insurance at, for example, the price
that equals the expected cost from the
risk? If models of one-shot decisions from
description seem to give a positive answer
to this question3, models of decisions from
experience suggest the opposite4. Which
theory should inform an insurance pricing
policy?
Situation-specific psychological pro-
cesses have also been proposed to explain
other aspects of decision-making, such as
the tendency to explore new alternatives.
Empirical evidence suggests that people
appear to insufficiently explore new alter-
natives in some situations (the most pop-
ular example is the preference for the
status quo, as shown by Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988), whereas they exhibit
the opposite tendency in others (e.g.,
unsafe sexual behavior and use of illicit
drugs; see, for example, Bechara, 2005).
Again, one could be tempted to explain
these apparently contradicting phenom-
ena by asserting that in some settings
people tend to explore insufficiently,
whereas in others they exhibit the opposite
bias.
This different-biases-different-explana-
tions approach has not spared the judg-
ment field. As a result, two important
streams of judgment research have led
3This is what Prospect Theory predicts, assuming a
convex value function for losses (see Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
4As predicted by models that assume best reply to
the information conveyed by small samples of past
experiences. According to this abstraction, decision-
makers’ preferences are biased toward the option
whose outcome is reinforcing most of the times—in
the current example, the risky option of not to insure.
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to apparently contradicting conclusions:
Whereas revision-of-opinion studies
hold that judgment is affected by con-
servatism (e.g., Phillips and Edwards,
1966) 5, calibration studies demonstrate
that judgment is affected by the opposite
bias—overconfidence (e.g., Fischhoff et al.,
1977)6. Once again, one might explain this
apparent contradiction by assuming that
in some settings judgment is conservative,
and overconfident in others.
Are the pairs of judgment and decision-
making biases mentioned in the previous
paragraphs really inconsistent, justifying
the development of specific, post-hoc the-
ories? Or is it possible to formulate a
more general theory that provides the
(sufficient) conditions for the different
biases, as well as their relative impor-
tance and joint effect? The field of behav-
ioral sciences lacks of such a theory (see
Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Erev
and Grainer, 2015), but some impor-
tant steps in this direction have recently
been made. For example, the contribu-
tion by Erev et al.’s (1994) addresses this
methodological issue within the judgment
field. This paper shows that conservatism
and overconfidence can coexist, and pro-
poses a common theoretical explanation
for the two biases—the assertion that
human judgment is affected by random
errors. Along this line, Dougherty et al.’s
(1999) MINERVA-DM memory model
accounts not only for the simultaneous
coexistence of conservatism and overconfi-
dence (besides other biases affecting judg-
ment), but also for the effect of experience
on the relative importance of these two
biases.
In the decision making domain, a
recent line of research has been trying to
shed light on the boundaries of some well-
known phenomena documented in pre-
vious literature. This is the case of the
recent discussions about the robustness
and generality of loss aversion provided
by, for example, Ert and Erev (2008, 2013)
5In the typical experiment, participants are asked the
probability of an event after having collected relevant
data. In this setting, judgment tends to be less extreme
than the corresponding objective probabilities.
6 In the typical experiment, participants are asked to
express their confidence that statements or answers to
general questions are accurate. In this setting, judg-
ment is observed to be more extreme than the average
accuracy rate.
and Yechiam and Hochman (2014) 7; the
conditions for underweighting of rare
events (e.g., Rakow et al., 2008); or the
construct of risk taking by Yechiam and
Telpaz (2011, 2013).
In another recent line of decision-
making studies, researchers have been
trying to clarify the (sufficient) conditions
under which different biases are likely to
occur. Studies in this domain abandon the
(subjective) value function metaphor, and
demonstrate the value of the assump-
tion that choice behavior is driven
by past experiences in similar situa-
tion (see Erev and Haruvy, 2014) 8. This
research trend includes, for example, the
contributions by Erev et al. (2015), which
analyzes choice behavior in negative-
sum betting games; Teodorescu and Erev
(2014), which highlights the conditions
that lead to under- and over-exploration in
the context of multi-alternative repeated
decision tasks with no description and
limited feedback; and by Zion et al. (2010),
which analyzes financial choice behavior.
Remarkably, most of the results reported
in these studies cannot be accounted for
by mainstream behavioral models (e.g.,
expected payoff maximization, risk aver-
sion, loss aversion, and the possibility
effect).
The contribution by Marchiori et al.
(2015) pushes further this experiential line
of decision-making research, extending
Erev et al.’s (1994) conceptual analysis and
Dougherty et al.’s (1999) MINERVA-DM
memory model to the decision-making
7The contributions by Yechiam, Hochman, and Telpaz
also analyze a cognitively-grounded explanation for
the effect of losses on choice behavior, alternative to
loss aversion. This alternative explanation holds that
losses increase subjects’ on-task attention, which in
its turn increases subjects’ sensitivity to the reinforce-
ment structure of the decision task at hand. This
attention-based account is supported by data from
behavioral, brain, and pupilometry studies.
8This idea is not new in Psychology. For example,
Skinner used it to explain why people “are more reluc-
tant to buy a second ticket to the theater after losing a
first one, than after losing themoney they had set aside
for that purpose” (Skinner, 1985:297). Instead of a
reflection of different categorizations (as proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), Skinner suggests that
in the two described situations people recall differ-
ent kinds of past experiences (which he referred to
as contingencies of reinforcement): On the one hand,
experiences involving protesting for something we
have already done and we refuse to repeat, and, on the
other, experiences involving (prompt) replacement of
spoiled or lost objects.
domain. Marchiori et al.’s demonstrate
the predictive value of models assuming
reliance on small samples of past expe-
rience and overgeneralization (intended
as the tendency to confound instances of
previously encountered tasks that are per-
ceived as similar to the decision prob-
lem at hand). Marchiori et al.’s model
provides sufficient conditions for two
pairs of apparently contradicting phenom-
ena documented in the judgment and
decision-making field: Over- and under-
weighting of rare events, and over- and
under-estimation of low probabilities.
A CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE
To cope with behaviors that cannot be
accounted for by the rational framework,
behavioral economists and psychologists
have developed insightful theories and
models of judgment and decision-making.
However, the dominant methodology has
consisted in building models that account
for behavioral anomalies in specific set-
tings. As a result, this methodological
approach has contributed to the fragmen-
tation of the field of behavioral economics,
and produced models whose predictive
power is often limited. These problems
prompt the question of what might be
the candidate theoretical framework for
the development of a more general the-
ory of choice behavior, alternative to the
rationality paradigm.
The recent developments in the deci-
sion making field mentioned earlier show
that the approach emphasizing the pri-
mary role of past experience as driver
of choice behavior can overcome the
methodological issues that have since long
accompanied the field of behavioral eco-
nomics and—more in general—that of
behavioral sciences. This is possible as this
perspective has been shown to provide
a coherent and powerful framework for
judgment and decision making modeling
(see, for example, Juslin et al., 2007; Nevo
and Erev, 2012).
However, that individuals make deci-
sions based on small samples of past expe-
riences in similar situations has to be
interpreted as an “as if” explanation, thus
prompting the question of to what extent
does this abstraction correspond to the
processes that actually occur in the human
brain (cf. Yechiam and Aharon, 2011).
Results from neuroscience have already
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been proven to be a valuable resource
for the improvement of economic mod-
els of learning and choice behavior by
highlighting, for example, the physiology
of emotions that affect decision mak-
ing 9, and by suggesting new and more
physiologically plausible modeling tech-
niques (Marchiori and Warglien, 2008,
2011).
In addition, research in neuroscience
could be very helpful in shedding
light on the mechanisms underlying
decision-making at the individual level.
Specifically, a question of central impor-
tance for the experiential research line of
decision-making is about how individuals
assess similarity between present and past
experiences. Understanding this process
by means of the traditional tools of empir-
ical behavioral investigation appears to
be a very difficult task: Compared to the
number of observations typically avail-
able in a behavioral study, individual
data appear to be affected by too much
noise and the number of free parameters
of a comprehensive model of individ-
ual behavior would be too large. In this
respect, we suggest that the contribu-
tion of neuroscience will be crucial in
pinpointing and clarifying the physical
processes according to which past expe-
riences are reinforced and mapped onto
newly encountered judgment and decision
making problems. Particularly relevant
to this issue is the recent neuro-research
on how past experience is used to imag-
ine future happenings and scenarios and
how analogy links between different sit-
uations are established at the brain level
(see, for example, Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Boyer, 2008;
Bar, 2009).
The emerging fields of genoeconomics,
geno-neuroeconomics, and evolutionary
neuro-social science might help under-
standing to what extent individual behav-
ior is learnt and to what extent it is affected
by genetics, and shed light on the impor-
tant issue of individual heterogeneity in
choice behavior, which has not yet been
exhaustively explained by behavioral stud-
ies. Along these directions, recent studies
in these emerging fields have already tried
9Brain studies on the role of regret on decisionmaking
are perhaps the most popular example (e.g., Camille
et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005).
to investigate how genetics affects indi-
vidual heterogeneity in choice behavior
(Parasuraman and Jiang, 2012), how risk
taking in investment portfolios is linked to
genetic variability (Cesarini et al., 2010),
the heritability of aspects of consumer
judgment and choice behavior (Simonson
and Sela, 2011), or how natural selec-
tion has shaped modern human behavior
(Lieberman et al., 2003).
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